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The Kenya government is striving to roll out its Vision 2030 
programme where ICT plays a major role in achieving the components of 
the Pillars associated with it. The government has variously encouraged 
for the rapid deployment of the high speed fiber optic cables across the 
country to make it easier for its citizens to do business amongst 
themselves, with the government and the various industry players [1]. 
Unfortunately, as the deployment of high speed internet connections 
becomes more widespread and popular among citizens, complex 
cybercrimes are also on the raise thus creating a demand for improved 
cyber security to the users via use early warning systems with intrusion 
detection capabilities covering cybercrime incidents [2]. It is for this 
reason that KENET, as a government supported entity embracing 
learning and research institutions, has been encouraging its member 
institutions to setup CIRT teams within their institutions. The teams are 
encouraged to deploy HoneyPots within their constituencies as one of 
the measures to help monitor cyber related incidents via generating 
incident reports which in turn would be used for identifying, 
understanding attackers and their communities modus operandi; cyber 
threats; prepare trend analysis on cyber threats; identify new tools or 
methods of cyber attacks; and act as early warning and prediction 
systems on cyber incidents [3].  The purpose of this study was to find out 
the extent to which deployment of HoneyPots as early warning detection 
tools for monitoring cyber related incidents had been embraced within 
KENET member institutions in Western Kenya, how they are aiding the 
institutions in knowing and understanding their adversaries; and 
allowing them to implement solutions that work in defending the critical 
internet and network infrastructures they manage. 
1.1 Objectives 
i. To examine the types of cyber security related incidents affecting 
KENET member institutions in western Kenya. 
ii. To determine factors affecting the deployment of HoneyPots by 
CIRTs in KENET member institutions in western Kenya. 
iii. To analyse the usability of HoneyPots in KENET member institutions 




2.1 Research Questions 
i. What types of cyber related incidents are affecting KENET member 
institutions in western Kenya? 
ii. What are the factors affecting the deployment of HoneyPots by CIRTs 
in KENET member institutions in western Kenya? 
iii. How can KENET member institutions in western Kenya use 
HoneyPots as proactive detection tools for monitoring cyber related 
incidents? 
2.2 Significance of the Study 
This research study aims at aiding CIRTs know and 
understand their adversaries; hackers and the various malwares, hence 
allowing them to be in a position to implement solutions that work in 
defending the critical internet and network infrastructure they manage. 
Abstract 
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study was guided by a descriptive study design with a study population of 117 staff 
members working in various institutions in western Kenya. Using simple random sampling 
technique, a sample size of 80 respondents were picked and administered with 
questionnaires, 70 questionnaires were returned for data entry and analysis using 
Statistical Package for social Sciences version 20. This implies that 87.5% of the 
respondents turned up for the study. According to the major findings, the study established 
that most of the KENET member institutions in western Kenyan, despite experiencing cyber 
security related incidents, had not setup CIRT teams nor deployed Honeypots to help them 
study cyber security incidents and take appropriate action to defend their constituencies. 
As a recommendation, the Government, being one of the economic stakeholders, and 
KENET, should come up with intervention measures through the Ministry of ICT making it 
mandatory for setup CIRTs. All CIRTs should then be required to direct part of their traffic 
to the national CERT which ideally should be based at Communication Authority of Kenya 
to form a Honey Net, which can further be linked with other internationally recognized 
Honey Net projects.  
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Beneficiaries of this survey include Government departments currently 
rolling out e-services and the Academia especially KENET member 
institutions. Based on the study, the Government, through its various 
ministries and departments, will strive to offer quality e-services to their 
clients in the full knowledge of secure data centers setup, as they will be 
more proactive with their cyber security issues; while investing in 
quality equipment and technical staff with clear cyber security mandates, 
development cyber security policies, and how cyber security issues can 
be handled more proactively within the legal boundaries. On the other 
hand, the Academia will be more involved in researches that tackle cyber 
related incidents thus be in a position of sharing cyber related crime 
intelligence with cooperating partners; allowing them to understand 
cyber crime incidents and their perpetrators. It will also allow them to 
act much more swiftly and proactively, before they are affected for 
example consider the work done by the HoneyNet Project 4 (Spitzner, 
2014), an all volunteer, non-profit security research organization which 
is one of the most well known examples of using HoneyPots for research; 
the data they collect is distributed around the world even as threats are 
constantly changing, this information has proved to be more and more 
critical. 
2.3 Scope of the study 
This survey is intended to evaluate the level of deployment of 
HoneyPots as early warning detection tools for monitoring cyber related 
incidents.  It was confined within the KENET member institutions in the 
western Kenya that are connected to the national fiber backbone. The 
survey was carried out within three months starting September to 
November 2014. 
2.4 Assumptions of the study 
i. All respondents will give honest responses. 
ii. Where HoneyPots were set up, they were done so correctly to avoid 
them being hacked, thus compromising the whole research project’s 
objectives. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Types of cyber security incidents affecting institutions 
3.1.1 Number of cyber security incidents 
85.7% of the institutions had registered less than - 10 cyber 
security incidents. 10% reported 20 or more incidents, while 4.3% 
reported between 11-19 incidents. This numbers are very low thus 
further proof on the need to setup CIRT/CERT department or teams to 
fully dedicate their time and resources in collecting cyber related 
incidents. This would help institutions to plan for disasters associated 
with cyber security incidents. As it is, very few staff and resources were 
being dedicated to cyber related incident.  
Table 15: Number of cyber security incidents 




Valid <=10 60 85.7 85.7 85.7 
11- 19 3 4.3 4.3 90.0 
=> 20 7 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.2 Most common cyber incidents cyber fraud  
22.9% of institutions reported that cyber fraud was their most 
common cyber incident, while 77.1% reported never experiencing cyber 
fraud cases. This could be attributed to low adaptation of online payment 
methods or none deployment of mechanisms to detect such incidents 
even though they were occurring.  
Table 16: Most common cyber incidents cyber fraud 




Valid Yes 16 22.9 22.9 22.9 
No 54 77.1 77.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.3 Most common cyber incidents Malware 
75.7% of institutions reported that malwares were their most 
common cyber incidents, while 24.3% reported that they did not 
experience any malware cases. This report could be attributed to the 
reliance on Anti Virus engines that are the most commonly deployed 
tools against viruses. 
Table 17: Most common cyber incidents Malware 




Valid Yes 53 75.7 75.7 75.7 
No 17 24.3 24.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
 
3.1.4 Most common cyber incidents Botnets  
Only 8.6% of the institutions reported that they had ever been 
victims of Botnets, while 91.4% indicated that they had never been 
affected by Botnets incidents. This could be due to non existence of data 
centres setup or incidents were occurring but no mechanisms to detect 
the same. 







Valid Yes 6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
No 64 91.4 91.4 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.5 Most common cyber incidents Spam  
57.1% of institutions reported that Spams were their most 
common cyber incidents, while 42.9% reported that they did not 
experience any Spam cases. This could again be attributed to the use of 
AV engines as the most widely deployed tool to control malicious 
software. 
Table 19: Most common cyber incidents Spam 





Valid Yes 40 57.1 57.1 57.1 
No 30 42.9 42.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
 
3.1.6 Most common cyber incidents Phishing 
Only 17.1% of institutions reported that Phishing was their 
most common cyber incident, while 82.9% reported that they did not 
experience any Phishing cases. This low figures are a further proof cyber 
security features very low in the Institutions priority areas. No 
mechanisms deployed to report on such incidents. 
Table 20: Most common cyber incidents Phishing 





Valid Yes 12 17.1 17.1 17.1 
No 58 82.9 82.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
 
3.1.7 Most common cyber incidents VoIP PBX fraud  
Among institutions in western Kenya, only 2.9% had reported 
that they had experienced VoIP PBX fraud, while 97.1% reported that 
they did not experience any VoIP PBX fraud cases. This could be 
attributed to low or non deployment of VoIP facilities within these 
institutions, or none deployment of sensor mechanisms to monitor VoIP 
facilities. 
Table 21: Most common cyber incidents VoIP PBX fraud 





Valid Yes 2 2.9 2.9 2.9 
No 68 97.1 97.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
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3.1.8 Most common cyber incidents Insider Threats  
Only 22.9% of the institutions had reported that they had 
experienced Insider Threats, while 77.1% reported that they did not 
experience any Insider Threats cases. Despite the large number of staff 
deployed in these institutions ICT units, this is a unique observation. 
Again, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms could be missing, staff 
are very highly disciplined or none existence of ICT policies to guide in 
ways of handling such cases. 
Table 22: Most common cyber incidents Insider Threats 





Valid Yes 16 22.9 22.9 22.9 
No 54 77.1 77.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.9 Most common cyber incidents Social media 
62.9% of the institutions had reported that they had 
experienced Social media incidents, while 37.1% reported that they did 
not experience any Social media incidents. Since most of the institutions 
surveyed were academic oriented, this is no surprise at all as most 
students use such media a lot. Institutions seem not to be filtering such 
traffic via their firewalls. Those with low numbers could be having strict 
policies on use of social media, or their firewalls are actively controlling 
such traffic. 
Table 23: Most common cyber incidents Social media 





Valid Yes 44 62.9 62.9 62.9 
No 26 37.1 37.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.10 Most common cyber incidents DOS attacks 
24.3% of the institutions had reported that they had 
experienced DOS attacks incidents, while 75.7% reported that they did 
not experience any DOS attacks incidents. This is an indication of low 
presence of the institutions in the World Wide Web, or none existence of 
mechanisms to monitor and report on DOS oriented attacks on services 
or facilities available online to their staff and clients.  
Table 24: Most common cyber incidents DOS attacks 





Valid Yes 17 24.3 24.3 24.3 
No 53 75.7 75.7 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.1.11 Most common cyber incidents Cyber Espionage 
7.1% of the institutions had reported that they had 
experienced Cyber Espionage incidents, while 92.9% reported that they 
did not experience any Cyber Espionage incidents. This being a more 
complicated concept of cyber crime, its rarity is not surprising at all. But 
again a lack of cyber monitoring and reporting tool could also come into 
play in such a scenario. 
Table 25: Most common cyber incidents Cyber Espionage 





Valid Yes 5 7.1 7.1 7.1 
No 65 92.9 92.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is need to conduct a research survey across all 
institutions that are affiliated to KENET as well as all government 
ministries and agencies to determine their preparedness in terms of 
detecting and monitoring cyber related incidents. This will help in 
facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber network traffic within 
KENET infrastructure and the country, and thereby be able to pinpoint 
ways of improving our networks security.  
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